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The monopoly over the exercise of violence is the main defining element of states according 
to the Weberian ideal-type taxonomy. (Weber 1991, in Jung, 78) However, the ability to 
wield effective control over a fixed territory and to use physical force, extract taxes and 
operate a system of arbitration has been claimed and successfully attained by other actors. As 
suggested by some, the erosion of the state’s monopoly over legitimate organized violence 
has provided the fertile ground for the proliferation of ‘new wars’ over the past few decades. 
(Kaldor, 4). On the other hand, state authorities have often been complicit in most illegal 
activities accompanying warfare and it might be reasonable to interpret the distinction 
between political and criminal as a false dichotomy (Kalyvas 2001, in Andreas (b), 51).  
Most of the contemporary military conflicts are classified as ‘new wars’, quite distinct from 
the confrontations between the standing armies of European sovereigns which served as a 
state-building exercise (Tilly, 173). These new types of conflict blur the lines between public 
and private, informal and formal, economic and political (Kaldor, 2) - the categories whose 
definition and adjudication are the essence of the state’s claim to legitimacy (Volkov, 165).  It 
is tempting to relegate the ‘new wars’ to the territorially confined domain of the pre-modern 
and modern and contrast them with the post-modernity of the developed world (Cooper). It 
appears that the world can be divided into ‘zones of peace’ with high levels of economic 
prosperity, full-fledged political systems and functioning civil societies and ‘zones of war’ 
ravaged by poverty, corruption and collapsed  state institutions and civic relations. (Buzan and 
Little, in Jung, 11). Such perspectives, however, overlook the fact that the ‘new wars’ bring 
together the ‘local’ and ‘global’ and engage them in a complex interplay. 
2The high levels of violence and acts of barbarity that are part of the everyday course of intra-
state conflicts no longer shock television viewers worldwide whose instant access to 
disturbing footage is one of the privileges of living in the technologically developed post-
modern world. The instant information flows, however, are only one aspect of the close 
connectivity between the domains of peace and conflict. Intra-state wars are internationalized 
both formally and informally (Andreas (b), 30). On the one hand, peacemaking missions by 
international institutions, humanitarian aid and diplomatic initiatives purport to keep violence 
in check and channel conflicts towards peaceful resolution. On the other hand, illicit supplies 
of arms, military hardware and embargoed items, people smuggling and the provision of 
enforcement and security services by foreign mercenaries are perceived as factors that lead to 
the continuation of violence. The picture, however, is far more nuanced and a differentiation 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ international influences would amount to an over-simplification. 
Indeed, a benevolent practice such as humanitarian aid has often assisted the warring sides 
and prolonged their conflict (Kaldor, 10; Schlichte, 33). Conversely, criminal activities, while 
condemned as greed-driven and self-serving, may generate positive effects such as improved 
access to much-needed supplies for the civilian population (Andreas (b), 33). 
The incentives that the ‘new wars’ provide for the flourishing of illicit trade make them
radically different from traditional warfare. Inter-state war, the two world wars serving as 
prime examples, leads to greater centralization, autarchy, increased control and the 
mobilization of resources by the formal state structures (Kaldor, 9). The growing
pervasiveness of the state and its ability to monitor and regulate all aspects of society ensures
enhanced enforcement capacity which leaves little room for the continuous undertaking of
illicit activities. The ‘new wars’ are composed of entirely different structures and practices. 
3They open up states to pressures from within and without, leaving multiple contending centers
of power and blurred chains of command. Political authority is increasingly fractionalized and 
power holders are easily captured by criminal interests. Borders are permeable, subject to 
informal control by contending militarized units, and the high demand for scarce goods offers
a lucrative business opportunity for those who are able to provide them. Thus, illicit actors are 
able to operate and profit, forming alliances with local and central elites in a setting that 
entails no distinction between political and economic motives (Andreas (a), 6).
A key question that arises in the context of the nexus between political, economic and military 
interests in the ‘new wars’ is whether activities such as smuggling, trafficking and arms 
dealing can be conceptualized as ‘illicit’ or should be interpreted as the logical by-product of 
an environment in which social norms and values have lost their standing. Schlichte has 
suggested that by imposing enormous costs on societies, intra-state wars ‘destroy state 
allegiances’ (36). A consequence of this is the emergence of contending power structures on 
which individuals in war-torn societies depend for their survival and livelihood. Moreover, 
the spread of criminality to all levels of society, and the ‘criminalization of politics’ (Andreas
(a), 6) entails a collective sense of complicity, making it difficult to distinguish between 
culprits and victims. 
The normalization of violence and its exercise by various informal and semi-formal militias, 
quasi-state security units and rebel groups not only takes up the functions of the state but also
alters its claim to legitimacy as a ‘political authority based on formal regulations’ (Jung, 17). 
While the territorial boundaries that delimit physical space are eroded by conflict, the 
structural boundaries of the state, defined by Volkov (168) as ‘constituted through the 
behavior and attitudes of participants’, are radically modified by the dramatic alteration in the 
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provide a favorable incentive structure for the growth of illicit trade, they also reinterpret 
previously entrenched normative boundaries and limitations. Therefore, as violence becomes 
a feature of everyday life, the institutionalized ‘normalcy’ of social relations is replaced by an 
environment in which a degree of predictability and safety can only be attained through 
constant readiness to compromise and adapt to the new structural boundaries. 
It would be an over-simplification to attribute the legitimization of illicit practices solely to 
the violent setting in which they take root and flourish. In practice, identical activities can be 
praised or defamed by political authorities and societies depending on the particular context. 
The heroes of the day can easily turn into tomorrow’s war criminals and profiteers if they lose 
the government’s approval. Societies are also quick to denounce those whom they have hailed 
as their champions provided that the circumstances have changed. However, the use of the 
legitimacy/illegitimacy duality for instrumental purposes does not change the underlying 
redistribution of the moral categories of right and wrong. The fact that some of the actors 
involved in arms trafficking or embargo busting are vilified at a particular point in time does 
not mean that the activity as such will be condemned accordingly.  
The relationship between the criminalization of society and the onset, persistence and end of 
military conflicts cannot be given a clear unidirectional interpretation. The typical ‘new war’ 
results in a rearrangement of existing power and economic relations, serving as a ‘highly 
effective mechanism of criminalized social advancement’. (Andreas (a), 4) While both 
winners and losers emerge, it is likely that those who have managed to capitalize on the 
benefits provided by the opportunity structure of conflict will consolidate their power and 
yield increased informal, or in some cases even formal, political influence. Thus, if the 
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it. While the ‘new wars’ have devastating effects for societies in general – destroying the 
economy and infrastructure, and bringing the battlefield to people’s homes – the illicit trade 
that accompanies them provides economic opportunities for adaptation at the micro level. 
The ‘new wars’ act as a catalyst of illicit trade and generate considerable profits for those who 
are able to strategically position themselves in the informal economy. In a sense, the 
outcomes are not very much unlike what happens in any legitimate economic environment –
there are big gains for a limited number of participants, while others profit less and some are 
inevitably left without any share. However, there are two features of the clandestine war 
economies that merit discussion because of their inherent connection to the development of 
conflicts and the role of societies in them. First, the overlap between the economic and 
military dimensions of the ‘new wars’ establishes a class of violent entrepreneurs who are 
actively engaged in both illicit trade and combat. Their material success and moral claim as 
the defenders of the group against its enemies grant them respect and appeal as models for 
emulation. Second, apart from setting the ground for the emergence of power holders who 
organize and deploy violence for economic and military ends, the clandestine economies of 
the ‘new wars’ also incorporate the whole society. Individuals engage in it as active providers 
of goods and services or as passive recipients, or sometimes as both. It is difficult, however, 
to distinguish between their motives for involvement – as suggested by Andreas, the 
polarization between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ is a false and misleading dichotomy (Andreas 
(b), 6).  
Military conflicts lead to a dramatic upheaval of existing social and economic hierarchies, 
radically repositioning the standing of individuals in them. The story of the ‘new wars’ is to a 
6large extent one of rapid adaptation to new circumstances and dramatic realignment of 
resources. As suggested by Andreas, the onset of conflict allows for ‘elite formation 
overnight’ – criminals coming back from their prison terms abroad establish themselves as 
powerful military commanders and previously obscure clerics or teachers emerge as 
charismatic leaders able to capture the hearts and minds of the people and channel the 
collective ethos in particular ways. ((b), 5) Amidst the collapse of public order and the 
disintegration of existing social relations, the distribution of power is radically altered by the 
outbreak of conflict and continuously modified during its persistence. In a milieu where 
violence has become the norm, those best suited to explore the opportunities for rapid 
advancement and accumulation of power resources will be the ones in possession of qualities 
that are normally considered to be going against society’s basic norms and values. The 
‘winners’ in the ‘new wars’, those able to amass economic and political resources, are likely 
to correspond to Veblen’s definition of the ‘predatory man’ – ‘asserting themselves forcibly in 
any case where no occupation alien to the predatory culture has usurped the individual’s 
everyday range of interests and sentiment’ (Veblen, 264).
The emergence of the ‘predatory man’ as the embodiment of successful social and material 
advancement in the context of war, coupled with the criminalization of politics, creates a new 
normative framework within society. In conjunction with other factors, such as persistent 
propaganda involving the dehumanization of the enemy and the appraisal of 
uncompromisingly militant behavior, the availability of the ‘predatory man’ as a template for 
success conditions social perceptions and attitudes towards violence. As the ringleaders of 
illicit trade networks are typically active as paramilitary leaders or rebel commanders, there is 
a symbiosis between their assertiveness through success in the battlefield and through the 
attainment of economic gains by participating in the clandestine economy. Hence, the strength 
7of the ‘predatory man’ as a referent object is reinforced by his ability to pose as the defender 
of a particular national, ethnic or religious community against an enemy that threatens its 
physical and cultural survival. It is not surprising, then, that the combined appeal of economic 
prosperity and physical strength, harnessed in defense of the endangered community, sets
violence as an acceptable and even desirable type of behavior.   
The possibilities of financial profit through involvement in illicit trade and the attainment of 
social respect through fighting the enemy bond together as an ideal that can attract a large 
pool of young males who are facing unemployment and destitution in war-ravaged societies. 
Thus, fresh recruits for both paramilitary formations and criminal networks are easily 
available. In fact, it is impossible to differentiate between the two structures and membership 
in one usually means involvement in the other one as well – the term ‘quasi-private criminal 
combatants’ used to describe Serbian paramilitaries captures their ambivalent status (Ron,
2000). The distinction between war and illicit activities is difficult to make – acts that are 
aimed at personal enrichment can easily be attributed to the goal of protecting the group or 
supplying it with goods vital for its survival. The key element that ensures success in both is 
the effective control of violence. The capacity to apply and manage organized force (Volkov,
59) is the definitive feature of warlords and militia commanders who have succeeded in 
sustaining themselves in prolonged military conflicts while at the same time securing the 
profitability of their illicit operations. As the ‘new wars’ effectively challenge the state’s 
monopoly over the use of force, violence remains a contestable resource whose control 
ensures the survival of groups and individuals and enables them to pursue and attain their 
objectives. 
The predatory men of intra-state wars, the formidable commanders and organizers of 
violence, are able to operate successfully because of their incorporation in a favorable
8political and social setting. They are able to count on approval and support by the state as long 
as their activities are congruent with the goals of political and military commanders. The 
inclusion of criminal actors into the political establishment allows them to continue with their 
profitable activities and consolidate their gains during the course of war and to emerge as the 
leading members of a new elite in its aftermath (Andreas (a), 4). Moreover, the persistence of 
illicit trade is inevitably contingent upon the involvement of society in its clandestine 
infrastructure. The distinction, prevalent in the ‘grievance’ and ‘greed’ literature, between 
conflict exploiters and conflict dependents (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 16) attempts to draw a 
clear line between those involved for the sake of profit and those who are merely seeking to 
ensure the survival of themselves and their families. Such differentiation is meaningful at the 
micro-level as participation in the clandestine economy is often the only means of livelihood 
left for individuals trapped in violent conflicts. However, the ‘criminalization’ of society 
distorts its normative basis, turning violence and illegal activities into acceptable practices 
even after the termination of conflict (Andreas (a), 4). Hence, the criminal dimension of war 
is perpetuated after the fighting has subsided, leaving a long-lasting legacy of disrupted social 
structures, political systems and economies captured by the interests of the former violent 
entrepreneurs turned businessmen or officials.     
The relationship between violence, illicit trade, and the onset, continuation and ending of 
conflict is complex, unpredictable and constantly conditioned by the interplay of domestic and 
international interests and power realignments. It brings a dramatic transformation of existing 
social structures, rendering traditional state boundaries, both territorial and structural, 
meaningless and introducing a different setting in which the ability to control violence leads 
to empowerment, while the ability to adapt one’s normative perceptions, attitudes and beliefs 
secures survival. Thus, accommodation to the changed circumstances and the ‘normalization’ 
9of violence and illegality becomes the norm. This leaves a lasting impact on societies, 
allowing the ethos, social relations and power balances established during conflict to persist 
long after the war has formally ended.  
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